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Department of Philosophy
Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science
University of California, Berkeley
I work mostly in the philosophy of language, semantics, and philosophical logic, and on related issues in metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, metaethics, and linguistics. At Berkeley I am a member of the Logic Group and a co-organizer of HPLMS, and I founded the Meaning Sciences Club.
I’ve been at Berkeley since Fall of 2009. Before that, I was on the faculty in the department of philosophy at NYU.
Before that, I did my PhD at MIT, graduating in 2008. My thesis chairs were Robert Stalnaker and Stephen Yablo. Alex Byrne and Irene Heim were the other members of my committee. My dissertation was about modality, content, the abstract structure of inquiry, and that sort of thing.
Before MIT, I received my BA from Michigan, in 2002. I was a double major in linguistics and philosophy. My undergrad thesis was on fictionalist views in metaphysics. My supervisor was Thomas Hofweber.
Before Michigan, I went to Stuyvesant High School, in New York City. I grew up in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn.
Here's a drawing of me by Michel Gondry.